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Abstract 
 
In this paper we argue that renter’s illusion may not be a form of asymmetric information neither 
irrationality but rather a way to include in our economic analysis evidence that while homo 
oeconomicus aims to do a good job of making choices, he frequently is not able to do that. 
Taxpayers do not know the “objective” world but take decisions according to mental and often 
biased representations of “their” world. We develop a simple model where misperception plays a 
fundamental role in the behavior of renters and allows overcoming the dichotomy between 
rational and irrational renter's behavior. In the paper we also pursue the two complementary aims 
of introducing “cognitive limitation” into the theory of local public finance and of filling a gap in 
this literature regarding the lack of  micro-foundations for the renter’s illusion hypothesis.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The renter effect – also known as the renter’s illusion – hypothesis holds that renters are more 
likely to support local public expenditures than homeowners. This effect is magnified when 
expenditures are financed with property taxes as opposed to other forms of financing (Oates, 
1988). As local governments in the Unites States and other countries collect a larger part of their 
revenue by this type of taxes, the renter effect is an important area of research in the public 
finance literature. While there is abundant evidence confirming the renter effect as an empirical 
fact, the debate on the nature of this issue is still unsettled.  
Two alternative approaches are followed in the literature to explain this phenomenon. The first 
follows Buchanan’s (1967) approach to fiscal illusion. Renters, as opposed to homeowners, pay 
their property taxes in a hidden way as an unspecified part of their rental payment.
1
 Thus, the 
renter effect is a consequence of the tenant’s cognitive limitation (illusion) of the actual tax-price 
of local public services.  
The second explanation interprets the renter effect as a rational behavior of tenants. Renters 
demand more public services because they receive larger net benefits (value of local services 
versus taxes actually paid) by comparison to homeowners. These benefits are different as a 
consequence of agents’ heterogeneity (e.g. endowments).   
A large literature addresses the renter effect in this dualistic perspective aiming to answer the 
issue of whether the renter effect is an irrational form or instead a rational form of behavior.   
To take part in this debate we should carefully define what these concepts really mean and, in 
particular, explain why behavior under fiscal illusion may or may not be an irrational form of 
decision-making. A full discussion of these subjects is beyond the scope of this paper but, at least 
two arguments need to be explained.
2
  
Two alternative interpretations exist about the rationality behind fiscal illusion. First, fiscal 
illusion is just a manifestation of information asymmetry and therefore it should be considered 
rational behavior. In the context of this paper, we will argue that renters may have different 
information sets than homeowners. In particular, renters may perceive a lower tax-price for the 
public provision of services so they demand higher quantities of public services. Second, fiscal 
illusion is a deviation from rationality because taxpayers suffer of biased misperceptions in one 
single direction. This implies that renters elicit inconsistent preferences in a systematic way. This 
second approach seems to be more elusive and it introduces another question in the debate. What 
                                                 
1
 See Carroll and Yinger (1994), Zodrow (2001, 2006) for an overview of the tax shifting of property taxes. 
2
 For a a general look at rationality in economics see, for example, McFadden (1999). For an overview of rationality 
behind fiscal illusion see  Dell’Anno and De Rosa (2013). 
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does rationality really mean? Defining economic rationality is not an easy task. Following Thaler 
and Sunstein (2003: 176), we could accept as reasonable that a rational agent does "a good job of 
making choices, or at least that he does a far better job than third parties could do”. If this is the 
case, Thaler and Sunstein (2003) claim that there is little empirical support to state that 
individuals are rational. Over the past forty years there has been an impressive accumulation of 
behavioral evidence of cognitive anomalies (e.g. people do not exhibit rational expectations, use 
heuristics that lead them to make systematic blunders, make different choices depending on the 
wording of the problem, value present consumption much more than future consumption, and so 
on). In this sense, to ask the question of whether a renter is rational or irrational leads us to open 
the door to an interesting and everlasting debate between the different views of the decision-
making process developed by Neoclassical and behavioral economists.  
To gain a perspective on this research, we propose a query to the reader that is a metaphor of our 
point of view on the question of the relevance of fiscal illusion and therefore also of the renter 
effect. 
Let us assume that you are in A and that your aim is to arrive in B or C, indifferently, at the 
lowest travel cost. There is a proportional toll that depends on the distance traveled. Your 
informative set is the road map in Figure 1. Where do you choose to go, in B or C?   
 
Figure 1: Driver’s road map 
                       
 
We turned right by choosing route β. If you have done the same, you, also like us, have suffered 
from an optical illusion (and also fiscal illusion) as the distances to B and C are actually exactly 
identical. Would you state that we have been irrational? Could anyone claim that this is due to an 
information asymmetry? Is the question or the map more complex than the decisions in the real 
world concerning taxes and public services? Does defining our behavior as irrational (by an 
economic viewpoint) reduce our misperception? (Even after we know that the routes α and β have 
the same length, they continue to look different).  
A 
C B 
α β 
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Both choices of either B or C yield the same net benefits, but some of us show a biased behavior 
consequence of a misperception. This example was just to say that investigating whether fiscal 
illusion (e.g. the renter effect) is consistent with a neoclassical idea of rationality can be a 
puzzling question, sometimes tautological, and frequently even an inconsequential issue. Out of 
the metaphor, people take decisions according to their perceptions of the “real” world. Thus fiscal 
illusion may not be a form of asymmetric information neither irrationality but rather a way to 
include in our economic analysis evidence that while homo oeconomicus aims to do a good job of 
making choices, he frequently is not able to do that. Taxpayers do not know the “objective” world 
but take decisions according to mental and often biased representations of “their” world.   
Faced with this premise what is that this paper aims to do? In our metaphor, a cognitive illusion 
affected the demand for public goods (leading to the  inefficient delivery of services: congestion 
of route β). At the same time, we assume that rational renters are affected by a perceptive illusion, 
due to the misperception of the effective size of the tax shifting of property taxes.   
This study proposes a simple model where misperception plays a role in behavior of renters. It 
attempts to overcome the dichotomy between rational and irrational taxpayer's behavior to 
explain the renter effect as a function of the level of misperception. We pursue two 
complementary aims. First, we introduce cognitive limitation into a local public finance,  issue 
that continues to be controversial. Second, we aim to fill a gap in this literature regarding the lack 
of micro-foundations for the renter’s illusion hypothesis (Blom-Hansen 2005).   
The article is divided into five sections. Following this introduction, the second section reviews 
the empirical literature on the renter effect. The third section provides a simple static framework 
to explain at a micro level the behavior of renters and owners and the emergence of the renter 
effect. The fourth section approaches the issue from a public policy perspective. The five section 
draws some conclusions. 
 
2. Literature review on the empirical analysis of the renter effect 
 
There is an enormous normative literature on the role of the renter effect in local public finance. 
Much attention has been paid to looking for whether the rational or the irrational (fiscal illusion) 
approaches to the renter effect is more consistent with the empirical evidence. Martinez-Vazquez 
(1983: 244) questions “the predominance, if not the validity, of the fiscal illusion hypothesis in 
explaining renters’ behavior”. Blom-Hansen (2005) distinguishes between fiscal ignorance 
(unbiased misperception) and fiscal illusion (biased misperception) of tax property burden. He 
finds that renters (and homeowners, too) usually misperceive property tax burdens (i.e. fiscal 
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ignorance). However, compared to homeowners, renters do not systematically underestimate the 
land tax rate (biased misperception, i.e. fiscal illusion). Blom-Hansen (2005) concludes that the 
renter effect is a rational behavior affected by fiscal ignorance but not an illusion. Alternative 
explanations of renter effect also exist. Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist (1988), Epple and Romer 
(1991) and Banzhaf and Oates (2012) refer to the capitalization of property taxes into house and 
land values. These authors sustain that an excessive level of public spending gets (negatively) 
capitalized into house prices which translates into lower rents. Thus, the renter effect can be seen 
as a selfish behavior, since the burden actually may indeed fall on property owners rather than 
renters. Similarly, Carroll and Yinger (1994) find that renters are rational to favor more 
expansions in the local public budget than are landlords as property taxes are, to a substantial 
extent, not shifted forward onto renters (Oates, 2005). Therefore, the rational explanation of the 
renter effect may arguably be taken as the prevalent wisdom. 
From an empirical perspective, the renter effect is largely confirmed by the data. Following 
Blom-Hansen (2005), two approaches have been proposed in the literature. First, there is a 
number of studies exploring the correlation between the proportion of renters and the aggregate 
spending (or tax revenues) in the jurisdiction. A second strand of the empirical literature explores 
renters’ preference for public goods as revealed by referenda. The papers using the first approach 
usually find that, ceteris paribus, a larger presence or share of renters is significantly correlated 
with higher levels of local public expenditure or tax levels. Oates (2005) calculates on the basis 
of several estimates of the renter effect for the U.S. that if all residents were homeowners, local 
public budgets would typically shrink by around ten percent. The second strand of the literature 
basically confirms renters’ desire or support for more public services relative to homeowners 
when they are called to elicit their preferences in a referendum. Table 1 summarizes the relevant 
literature using this classification. 
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Table 2. Survey of studies on the renter effect 
Author Data Dependent var. Renter effect? 
1
st
  Approach    
Barr and Davis (1966) 
64 county governments of 
Pennsylvania 
Expenditure per capita Yes 
Bergstrom and Goodman 
(1973) 
826 municipalities located in 10 
US states 
Expenditure Yes 
Lovell (1978) 136 Connecticut towns School expenditure Yes 
Lovell (1978) CT school districts Expenditure per pupil Yes 
Gronberg (1979) 83 Chicago suburbs Total municipal expenditure Yes 
Beck (1984) 219 California municipalities General municipal expenditure Yes 
Brazer and McCarty (1987) 
600 school districts in 
Connecticut, New Jersey and 
Virginia 
School and general expenditure Yes 
Schwab and Zampelli (1987) 73 US cities and counties Police expenditure Yes 
Deno and Mehay (1987) US municipalities 
Different types of Total 
Expenditure 1 
Yes 
Santerre (1989) 
CY a) school District 
b) municipalities 
a) Expenditure per pupil 
b) Municipal expenditure 
Yes 
Megna and Lee (1990) Wisconsin sch. district Expenditure per pupil Yes 
Bogart (1991) New Jersey municipalities Public Works Exp Yes 
Gonzale, Means, and Mehat 
(1993) 
California municipalities Police Expenditure Yes 
Dollery and Worthington 
(1999) 
46 local governments in 
Tasmania, Australia 
General expenditure Proportion 
of homes owned 
Yes 
Gemmell et al. (2002) 54 English and Welsh counties General expenditure No 
Both approaches    
Blom-Hansen (2005) 
a) Survey data Danish renters’ 
and home-owners’. 
b) 272 Danish municipalities 
a) perception of the land tax 
system 
b) Land tax rate; Land tax 
revenue; Tax structure 
No 
2
nd
 Approach    
Hanushek (1975) 
Two referenda on expenditure 
increases in Cleveland 
Probability of voting for 
expenditure increase 
Yes 
Peterson (1975) 
Household voting for tax and 
Expenditure proposals in US 
school districts 
Desired level of school 
spending 
Yes 
Levy (1979) California Votes for expenditure cuts Yes 
Martinez-Vazquez (1983) 
Referendum on expenditure 
increases in St Louis 
Percentage ‘yes’ votes Yes  
Schokkaert (1987) 
Survey data from a sample of 
2404 inhabitants in Puurs, 
Belgium 
Demand for public spending No 
Moomau and Morton (1992) 
Referendum to increase 
property taxation in New 
Orleans 
Probability of a ‘yes’ vote Yes 
Banzhaf and Oates (2012) 
open space referenda in the 
U.S. 
Log-odds of Voter Approval of 
Referenda 
No 
 
 
3. A simple Model of Fiscal Illusions in Local Government 
 
In this section, we present an analytical framework to explain the emergence of the renter effect 
as a special case of a rational taxpayer affected by a fiscal illusion, or alternatively, the model 
allows us to consider the rational taxpayer (no- renter effect and no fiscal illusion) as a special 
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case of a wider set of behaviors. The model aims to explain the difference between renters and 
homeowner’s preferences in the demand for public services. We will assume that local 
governments provide public services (Samuelson, 1954).  
Local governments finance the public provision of services by levying two types of taxes: a tax 
on (housing) property ( pt ) and fees for services ( st ). Consequently, it is assumed that local 
governments split, in a not necessarily transparent way for resident taxpayers, the cost of public 
provision both on property taxation and the other source of revenue (e.g. fees for services or lump 
sum
3
). 
We assume that in the jurisdiction live three types of taxpayers/voters: N1 Renters (rent), N2 
Householders that only own their own house (own) and N3 Householders that own two houses 
into the jurisdiction - one owner-occupied and the other one tenant-occupied (own2), with 
N1+N2+N3=N. Each voter occupies only one house, and in each house lives just one voter. This 
allows us to have a number of houses equal to the number of voters. Without loss of generality, 
owners of the houses occupied by tenants are all residents in the same jurisdiction.
4
 For 
simplification we also assume that the houses in the jurisdiction are all of identical size and 
(standardized) value which is fixed to 1. Thus, the jurisdiction’s real estate value (base of the 
property tax) is the price of house (pH=1) for the number of houses, which is equal to the size of 
the electorate (N). 
 
3.1 Taxpayer’s utility function 
Each voter has preferences defined over private and public consumption. Private consumption is 
financed by the after (national and local) tax exogenous income.
5
 Assuming homotheticity and 
constant elasticity of substitution between private and public goods, the CES utility function of h-
agent is:  
      
1/
1 1, 1h h h hU y g y T G
 
     
  
     (1) 
in which   is defined by the elasticity of substitution   as: 1 1   ; 
hy  is the income after 
central government taxes of the householders; 
1  is the elasticity of taxpayers’ utility for private 
                                                 
3
 To keep the model simple, fees for local public services work as a lump tax in the model presented here. 
4
 We considered also more complex structures of ownerships in the jurisdiction, including occupied and non-
occupied houses, ownership residents and no residents, homeowners with multiple houses which means a number of 
houses higher than the number of voters. However, by calibrating the models with reasonable proportions of these 
variables, we find that it yielded the same qualitative results as in the simpler version of ownership in the text.  
5
 Assuming exogenous income is reasonable in a context of local taxation where revenues are collected from 
property taxes and user service fees.  
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goods; 
hT  and hG  are the perceived “tax price” and benefit from  the local public government. By 
assuming that residents make decisions based on “perceived” tax prices and benefits we realize 
that “at the end of the day” the budget constraint will not lie to them; that is, their behavior may 
not respond to the tax price by substituting away from public goods but the income effect of 
lower income to buy other goods will be eventually noticed. However, we are assuming in 
essence that agents make decisions “at the start of the day.” For example, renters vote to increase 
taxes on property before those taxes are levied.
6
 Importantly, our model does not exclude the 
possibility of “rational” behavior with agents anticipating what will happen “at the end of the 
day,” but that behavior is found to be a special case in the model. That is, the model does not 
exclude a priori full rationality but we allow deviations from it due to fiscal illusion. 
At the cost of lower analytical tractability, we do not make strong assumptions about the 
elasticity of substitution between private and public consumption. Several past studies in Table 2 
indicate that renters overall may obtain larger net-benefits than owners from local public 
expenditures. Thus, we test if the results qualitatively change assuming: (a) different elasticities 
of substitution between renters and owners with 
1 1
rent own  ; and (b) two quite different 
elasticities of substitutions between public and private goods for all residents: in particular 
assuming 2   with a CES utility function and a Cobb-Douglas utility function ( 1  ).7  
The Cobb-Douglas utility function implies no relationship of complementary or substitution 
between the public and private goods and this may seem unreasonable. On the other hand, 
looking at the types of services provided by local governments it is hard to fix a value of  . 
Sometimes Municipal public services range from being perfect substitutes (e.g. nursery and 
primary school, urban public transport) to being perfect complements (e.g. utilities, street 
maintenance) with private consumption. The model is derived in a symbolic form, so that it may 
be adapted to both possibilities of substitution  1,    or complementarity  0,1  . However, 
we will assume that local public goods provided by municipalities have a more substitute than a 
complementary nature. Therefore, the default version for the model in the further analytical 
elaboration has an elasticity a substitution greater than 1 ( 2  ). 
                                                 
6
 In the manner of the choice in Figure 1 “Driver’s road map”, the individual has to decide to turn to the left or to the 
right before arriving at point C or B. Therefore his choice/vote is ex-ante.  But shouldn’t the budget constraint avoid 
the repeated behavior just based on perceptions? Again Figure 1 may explain the repeated behavior based on 
perception. Moreover, often times the budget constraint is so far off (e.g. at the end of the year) and be hard to 
discern (for example, because of the complexity of the tax system) that it can be difficult for a “normal” taxpayer to 
correctly know how much is paid in taxes. 
7
 For the sake of space,  the analytical solutions for the CES with 2   are reported in the appendix.  
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An important contribution of our model is to weigh up the costs and benefits of public policies 
for different patterns of cognitive alterations. We indicate with 
hT  the “perceived” individual 
local tax burden and hG  is the “perceived” provision of local public goods. 
As noted above, individual tax burdens depend on the property tax ( pt ) and fees for public 
services or lump sum charges ( st ). The renter effect implies that tenants do not appropriately 
perceive the shifting of property taxes onto housing rental rates, thus the property taxes include 
the parameter  0,1I   to take into account the size of the actual tax-shifting. Thus I=0 means no 
tax-shifting and I=1 all the tax on property is paid by renters via an increase in their rental 
payments. The misperception about tax burdens is accounted by the parameter “RE” (Renter 
Effect), with RE=1 indicating renters who do not associate an increase in rental payments with 
higher property taxes. To make the interpretation of variables simpler and more homogenous, the 
parameter for illusion on the revenue side is defined as r  1-RE. Thus r  ranges from 1 to 
0,and a unitary value means that the standard assumption of no cognitive limitation in the 
taxpayer’s perception of tax burden holds.   
In general, if we assume that taxpayer’s cognitive limitations cause misperceptions of the burden 
of taxation (revenue illusion), we cannot exclude  that he misperceives also the benefits of public 
expenditure (expenditure illusion, e )
8
. Consequently, the renter effect may depends on the net 
differences between tenant and landlord’s perceived property tax burdens and the differences in 
their perceived benefits associated with the provision of public services. Although this form of 
misperception can happen, there are not rationales to assume that the degree of misperception in 
public expenditure changes according to the endowment of real estate. Consequently, we assume 
a default value of 1e   for both types of taxpayers in the following discussion.  
Fiscal illusion on the revenue side is much more relevant for renters’ decision making than for 
homeowners. This is due to the underlying assumption that the tenant may wrongly perceive the 
shifting of property taxes while landlords formally have to pay the property tax. This implies that 
we can fix 1r   for homeowners. To prevent misinterpretation and over parameterization, we 
omit r  for homeowners in equation (2).   
Summarizing, for each taxpayer, we assume the following form of taxation: 
                                                 
8
 Puviani (1903) distinguished between pessimistic and optimistic fiscal illusion on the expenditure side. The first 
one may be accounted with  0,1e  . It means that citizens perceive the utility of public expenditure lower than 
real. The optimistic fiscal illusion ( 1
e  ) occurs when public services are perceived by citizens greater than their 
“real” value. 
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 
 
 
rent
own
2 2own
r p s
h p s
p s
I t gt
T t gt
I t gt
  


  

     
  (2) 
We assume that local public goods yield different utilities depending on the taxpayers’ 
endowments. Two forms of benefits occur in our model: a “consumption effect” - due to higher 
consumption of public services - and an “endowment or wealth effect” - due to the capitalization 
of public services into the houses price. This capitalization is accounted for by the parameter   in 
expression (3)-. Equation (3) summarizes the benefits (or costs) of public goods accounted for the 
individuals’ utility functions. In particular, renters experience an increase in utility due to the 
higher consumption of public goods and the two different types of owners,  own and own2, get 
benefits both from public consumption and (if  >0) from the capitalization of local services into 
houses’ prices (own and own2). 9   
 
 
rent
1own
2 1 2own
e
h e
e
g
G g
g

 
 


  
  
   (3) 
 
3.2 Taxpayer’s demand of Local public goods 
Each taxpayer maximizes a utility function according to their house endowment. This implies that 
we substitute in (1) for the appropriate taxation in (2) and benefits from public services in (3). 
The optimal demand for the public provision is denote by  *hg  which takes different values for 
the different types of taxpayers.  
Table 1 reports the demands for local goods  *hg  for taxpayers h = rent, own, own2 under the two 
assumptions of imperfect substitution between the public and private goods, and with a Cobb-
Douglas approximation. A consequence of the more general CES form is several solutions of the 
FOC; in order to generalize the solution, we need to constraint the domain of the variables as 
reported in Appendix 1.
10
 For the elasticity of substitution the solutions are defined for the 
predetermined values of σ=1 and σ=2.   
                                                 
9
 The parameter   may also take negative values due to an excess public spending resulting in lower housing values 
(e.g. Martinez-Vazquez and Sjoquist, 1988). However, we derive the model assuming 1   , thus, the overall effect 
(i.e. consumption and wealth) of public spending can be negative in terms of taxpayer’s utility only for types 
“own2.” 
10
 The results with sigma=2 are calculated by by using “Mathematica 8”. 
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Table 1: Taxpayer’s demand of public good 
Renter 
 1*
1
1 rent
rent
s r p
y
g
It t





 
 
      
2
1*
22 2
1 1
1
1
e rent
rent
s r p e s r p
y
g
I It t t t

 
    



    
 
 
Owner-occupied  
 1 own*
own 1
1
s p
y
g
t t





 
  
         
1*
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 2 2 1 1 2
e rent
own
p s s e p s e
y
g
t t t t t

  
            
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To survey how taxpayer’s preferences for public expenditure depend on the exogenous variables 
and parameters of the model, table 2 summarizes the sign of second derivatives for the renter. It 
makes plain that higher renters’ demand may be due to the mixed effects of misperception of the 
property tax (i.e. renter’s illusion) or differences in the net benefit (i.e. rational behavior).  
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Table 2: Signs of the 2
nd
 derivative of the demand of public good 
 
*
reng  
*
owng  
*
own2g  
*
hg I   
0 0
0
r
otherwise
 


 0 + 
*
h rg    
0 0
0
I
otherwise



 0 0 
*
h pg t   
0 0 0
0
rI
otherwise
  


     
*
hg y   + + + 
*
h sg t         
*
hg          
*
h eg    (only 2  ) + + + 
*
hg    (only 2  ) + + + 
Notes: For derivatives of *own2g  with 2  , the results are derived with  0.5,2   instead of 
 1,2  .This  was need to avoid reporting further details on the domains for multiple solutions. 
 
 
In a ceteris paribus approach, the renters’ demand is higher than that for owners if , 2rent own owny y , 
, 2r own own   and, assuming imperfect substitution of private and public goods, if 
, 2rent own own
e e   
and  , 2remt own own  .  
Figure 1 compares taxpayers’ demands for public goods as a function of the degree of 
misperception on revenue ( r ), assuming there is complete tax shifting of the property tax (I=1).  
 
Figure 1: Taxpayers’ demand for public goods with complete tax shifting 
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Figure 1 illustrates how taxpayers’ preferences for public expenditure depend on the imperfect 
substitution between the “real tax burden” (measured by tax shifting) and the cognitive limitation 
of the agent (measured by r ). Taking into account this relationship we can now analyze the 
effects of changes in the other exogenous variables. Figure 2 illustrates what happens as the result 
of higher income and/or a relatively greater elasticity of the agent’s utility from the public good.11 
 
Figure 2: Renter’s Demand of public good 
    
Let us examine just the case of the different levels of tax shifting more closely. Figure 3 shows 
how conflicting rationales explaining the renter effect may emerge from a dichotomist 
explanation (rational behavior versus illusion) of this phenomenon. A Pro-illusion argument 
(solution A): the voter is affected by high renter illusion (RI=0.9, r =0.1) but at the same time he 
has also a rational expectation about the level of property tax shifting in rental housing (I=0.9). 
An indefinite result (solution B) where renter’s illusion and tax-shift coexist (RI=0.3; I=0.3). And 
a pro-rational behavior argument (solution C) where renters perceive (almost) rightly that more 
public expenditures mean higher tax burdens (low illusion: r =0.9) and they also know that tax 
shifting into the rental price is minor in size (I=0.1).  
 
                                                 
11
 See the appendix for a description of the values settings for the simulation. Red surfaces estimated with 
2 14renty  ;
2
1 .5  ; White surfaces is estimated with
1 10renty  ; 
1
1 0.7  . The level of public good provision is represented by 
the (yellow) plane. 
r
*
rentg
I
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Figure 3: Different Renters’ demands for the public good 
From this analysis, we conclude that, although there can be alternative rationales behind renters’ 
preferences for public good provision, they all lead to demand the same quantity of the public 
good. This makes it rather clearer the challenge of testing via an empirical approach which 
rational or irrational behaviors actually causes the observed renter effect.  
 
3.3 The Local Government:  Public Budget 
In this section, we provide some discussion on how financial illusion and the shifting of property 
taxes may affect local fiscal policies. The most significant difference between the micro and 
macro analysis in our model is that, at an aggregate level, both fiscal illusion and tax shifting are 
not relevant in terms of the actual budget (i.e. 1r e    and  0,1I  ).  
Following Holtz-Ezkin (1992), there are two approaches we can follow to analyze the different 
effects on local government spending and revenue collections. One approach is to build upon the 
long tradition in public finance using the median voter model. The second approach (e.g. Inman, 
1985; Feldstein and Metcalf, 1987) is to explain fiscal policies by assuming that all citizens (and 
not just the median voter) influence final budget decisions. In this latter approach there is a 
representative weighted average voter who selects the final policies.
12
 
To create a normative benchmark with which to examine the robustness of the local fiscal 
policies we consider both approaches. These models are calibrated with values derived in the past 
literature plus our own estimates based on data for OECD countries. The calibrated models are 
used to get numerical simulations of the renter effect and its effect on the government budget.  
                                                 
12
 See Inman (1987) for an overview of these alternative's views. 
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Let us assume that the government must satisfy a feasibility constraint with revenues having to 
cover expenditures.
13
 Thus, a straightforward design of local taxation to balance the budget is 
available. It consists of fixing a flat property tax per-house (i.e. per capita) equals to the fixed cost 
of public provision  p Ft C N  and a public fee equals to the per capita variable cost  s vt C N
. Equation (4) shows the budget constraint of the jurisdiction is:  
   * *
1 1
average cost
N N
prop servF V
h h
h h
tax price
C C
C g g g N Tt t
N 


        (4) 
 
3.4 The Local Government:  The optimal Supply of Local Public goods 
We begin by describing what fiscal policy would look like if policies were chosen by a social 
planner who maximizes an objective social welfare function  hloc.gW f u  with h  rent, own, 
own2,  subject to the budget constraint in (5). In particular, we use a Benthamite (weighted 
average of agents’ utility) social welfare function, including all the residents of the local 
jurisdiction. In this case the optimal (social) supply of public (non rival) good is the weighted 
average of voters’ demands:14 
* * * *
loc rent own own2
locW g ag bg cg
g

   

    (5) 
where: 1a N N ; 2b N N ; 3c N N .  
From Table 2, it is straightforward to predict the effect of changes in several exogenous variables 
on the supply of public goods. Undefined effects at the aggregate level emerge only for the tax 
shifting parameter (I) and the proportion of renters (a). Numerical simulations of equation (5) 
allow us to evaluate the effects on the provision of the public good (Figure 5). Appendix 1 reports 
the parameters used for the calibration of the model. 
 
                                                 
13
 That does not preclude that the national government provides a set of national public goods and also transfers to 
local unit. However, we will formally ignore these possibilities because they are not relevant for the issue addressed 
in this paper. 
14
 Another possibility would be to consider a Lobbying model were the weights do not explain size but the power to 
influence the public good provision to one’s favor. 
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Figure 5: Public good provision (Benthamite Welfare Function) 
                              
According to our simulation output, the model can  explain the empirical stylized findings that: 
(1) in jurisdictions with higher proportions of renters (a), there is a higher level of public 
expenditure; (2) the supply of public goods decreases with increases in tax shifting (with 0.5r 
), which correspond with the renter effect explained as “rational” behavior; and (3) the supply of 
public goods decreases  with increases in the misperception about  the actual property tax burden 
(with 0.5I  ), which corresponds with the renter effect explained as “irrational” behavior. 
The model shows that 0loc rW     if 0I  . In terms of political economy implications, this 
means that higher levels of misperception increases welfare in the presence of tax shifting. The 
rationale behind this finding is that while homeowners recognize the reduction of the tax burden 
as a consequence of the tax shifting, renters - as affected by tax misperception - do not account in 
their utility function for the higher effective tax burden. Accordingly, in a world of taxpayers 
with different degrees of misperceptions, the optimal fiscal policy would be to exploit the fiscal 
illusion phenomena by the social planner. In this case, the aggregate “real” tax burden does not 
change but the aggregate “perceived” tax burden decreases. This is the first-best solution for 
fiscal policy in presence of fiscal illusion. This reasoning may be considered an extension of 
behavioral political economy into public finance. In particular, it may be considered a public 
policy that follows the libertarian paternalism approach to public choice as proposed by Thaler 
and Sunstein (2003).  
 
Finally, we run a numerical simulation of the model substituting the optimal social provision (5) 
in the budget constraint (4) to get the supply of local public goods and size of the public budget 
as functions of tax misperception. 
,r I
*
locg
 a = c = 0.35
 a = c = 0.25
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In the simulation analysis a relevant issue is the calibration of the model’s parameters. Lacking 
data on renter and owners makes it necessary to mix different sources of data. Thus, we set the 
model with the following default values:  From Oates’s (2005) we obtain the proportion of 
renters, and also home owners’ incomes. He estimates that about 35 percent of residents are 
rental occupants. Thus, we fix a c  0.35 and b  0.30 as default values. For households’ gross 
income Oates (2005) assumes the 1992 the median income of U.S. occupants of rental units is $ 
20,731 and of homeowners, $ 38,088. 
For the taxation parameter we calibrate the model using OECD data (2012). This dataset reports 
the revenue of “Recurrent taxes on immovable property” paid to Local government (code series 
4100). Hence, we estimate the average ratio respect to GDP for all the OECD countries 
between1990 to 2010 (0.7% of GDP).
15
 This rate is applied to the weighted average income of 
renters and homeowners estimated by Oates (2005), to get the amount of property tax per house (
32,000 0.007 220pt    ).
16
  
No comparable data are available for the level of fee for services of public goods provided by 
municipalities. Considering that user charges (e.g. water, sewerage, refuse collection, market 
fees, primary school) are traditional sources of local government revenue, based on the rough 
evidence existing on local budgets, we consider  a reasonable approximation to fixing this 
parameter at 50% of the tax revenues from immovable property ( 110st  ). A summary of default 
values is in appendix A. 
Table 3 follows two alternative hypotheses about gross income among local taxpayers. In the first 
exercise we use the same income for all the citizens. In the second simulation we apply Oates 
(2005) values for gross income. 
                                                 
15
 We opt for OECD unweighted average revenue ratio instead of US ratio because the latter is an outlier. US average 
recurrent taxes on immovable property paid to Local government on the GDP is the highest values among the OECD 
countries (2.73%) followed by Canada and Israel. For 29 on 34 OECD, the recurrent revenues as percent of GDP 
from taxes on immovable property is lower than 1.4%. However the main results do not change qualitatively by 
setting the model with values that fits with US economy: 32,000 0.027 840pt     and 420st  . 
16
 It implies that the amount of property tax per each own is $220 and for own2 is $440.  
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Table 3: Simulation Output – Benthamite Welfare function 
 Parameters , 2 32000rent own owny y   , 221000; 38000rent own owny y   
  
*
Locg  
Public budget 
(mln) 
*
Locg  
Public budget 
(mln) 
1) 0r   1.265 4.174 1.015 3.349 
2) .5r   0.757 2.497 0.681 2.248 
3) 1r   0.578 1.907 0.564 1.861 
4) .8rI    0.591 1.950 0.607 2.005 
5) .2rI    1.093 3.606 0.879 2.902 
 
The simulation results reveal that misperception about property taxes leads to increases in local 
governments’ public expenditures. Thus fiscal illusion regarding the property tax explains the 
empirical findings on the positive correlation between the size of public expenditures and the 
share of renters in the total population.  
 
3.5 The optimal supply of local public goods  in a median voter world  
This section analyzes the provision of local government service under the assumption that fiscal 
policy is set by the median voter (Downs, 1957; Black, 1948). As government maximizes the 
median (med) voter’s utility, the results with this approach strictly depend on the proportions of 
individuals aggregated by house endowment and their income distribution. To examine the effect 
of these variables the analysis is performed in three different scenarios. 
Each scenario is structured in four steps: (1) Assuming a jurisdiction of 10,000 voters, we extract 
(the) gross income of residents according to their status of renters or owners; (2) Fixing the 
default values for the model, we estimate for each taxpayers' group (rent, own and own2) the 
optimal demand of the local public good; (3) We aggregate voters to estimate the median value 
and assume her most preferred quantity to be the one supplied by the local jurisdiction; (4) 
Substituting 
*
Locg  in the government budget constraint we estimate the size of public expenditure. 
 
Scenario 1:  
Assuming no differences in gross incomes between renters and owners, we fix it to the weighted 
average of U.S. data for 1992 reported by Oates (2005): 2rent own owny y y  32,000. The model 
is run with the following default values: 0.5;I  0.5;  220pt  ; 110st  ; 0.5r  ; 1e  ; 
1  . Table 4 shows the output for the numerical simulations.  
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Table 4: Simulation Output – Equal incomes 
 Parameters 
*
rentg  
(3500) 
*
owng  
(3000) 
*
own2g  
(3500) 
*
Locg  
(median) 
Public budget 
(mln) 
1) 0r   2.621 0.584 0.493 0.584 1.928 
2) .5r   1.168 0.584 0.493 0.584 1.928 
3) 1r   0.658 0.584 0.493 0.584 1.928 
4) .8rI    0.507 0.584 0.681 0.584 1.928 
5) .2rI    21.875 0.584 0.373 0.584 1.928 
 
From Table 4, we point out that while the misperception of property tax burden increases renter’s 
preference for public expenditure, this may be not relevant to determine the optimal supply of 
local public services. The final result depends on the size of tax shifting parameter (I), fiscal 
illusion regarding the property tax ( r ), and the proportions of renters and owners (a, b and c). 
Figure 6 shows graphically how the renter effect may actually modify the local provision of 
public goods according to the level of tax shifting and with 0.5r  . The bold black line 
indicates the median’s preference for the public good. 
 
Figure 6. Median Voter’s demand of public good Vs Tax shifting (Equal income) 
 
Scenario 2:  
Here we assume different gross incomes for renters and owners with renty  21,000 and 
, 2own owny  38,000, and we use the same default values as in the previous simulation.   
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Table 5: Simulation Output – different incomes between groups 
 Parameters 
*
rentg  
(3500) 
*
owng  
(3000) 
*
own2g  
(3500) 
*
Locg  
(median) 
Public budget 
(mln) 
1) 0r   1.720 0.694 0.585 0.694 2.289 
2) .5r   0.767 0.694 0.585 0.694 2.289 
3) 1r   0.432 0.694 0.585 0.585 1.930 
4) .8rI    0.333 0.694 0.809 0.694 2.289 
5) .2rI    1.476 0.694 0.443 0.694 2.289 
 
As for the first scenario in this simulation the renter effect may also have consequences for the 
local public budget. Figure 7 shows the median taxpayer’s preference for the public good (bold 
black line) with 0.5r  . 
 
Figure 7. Median Voter’s demand of public goods Vs tax shifting (different incomes) 
 
Scenario 3:  
In this scenario, we assume differences between and within renters and owners’ gross incomes. 
Following the literature on income distribution, we assume a lognormal distribution of income 
within each of three groups of taxpayers. As the median of the lognormal distribution is e , we 
derive the location parameter (μ) from Oates’s (2005). To the best of our knowledge, distinct 
estimates of the scale parameter    for renters and owners’ income distributions are not 
available. Thus, we assume that each group of householders has the same standard deviation 
 h  . In particular, Campano and Salvatore (2006) estimate a value of σ for the lognormal 
*
hg
r 
I
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distribution of income in USA equal to 0.65.
17
 Therefore  ,0.69 95 5.renty LogN  and 
 , 2 10.55,0.65own owny LogN .  
 
Table 6: Simulation Output – different income between and within groups 
 Parameters 
*
rentg  
(3500) 
*
owng  
(3000) 
*
own2g  
(3500) 
*
Locg  
(median) 
Public budget 
(mln) 
1) 0r   1.690 0.685 0.579 0.871 2.873 
2) .5r   0.753 0.685 0.579 0.671 2.213 
3) 1r   0.424 0.685 0.579 0.549 1.813 
4) .8rI    0.327 0.685 0.801 0.567 1.872 
5) .2rI    1.450 0.685 0.438 0.755 2.492 
 
The simulation outputs in table 6 show that the under-perception of tax burden increases the 
median voter’s preference for public expenditure. Thus, fiscal illusion regarding the property tax 
explains the empirical findings of a correlation between public expenditure size and the percent 
renters. Figure 8 shows the distribution of the demands for public goods in the jurisdiction. 
 
Figure 8: Overall demand of Local Public Provision  0.5; 0.5rI    
 
 
The simulations in the three scenarios show that if 
1 1
rent own   (i.e. if renters’ overall elasticity for 
public goods is higher than that for homeowners) the renter effect is stronger. In this sense we 
find support for the hypothesis that beyond misperception issues, the different preferences for 
public services goods between two groups of households may also explain the renter effect. 
                                                 
17
 They extract a dataset from the U.S. Census Bureau report, Money Income in the United States, 1999. 
*
hg
h
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Conclusively, these simulations show that when government maximizes the median (med) voter’s 
utility in a (realistic) context where (a) the proportion of renters is lower than homeowners and 
(b) the gross income between (scenario 2) and within (scenario 3) these groups is different, thus 
the median voter is usually a homeowner. As a result the issue of whether the renter effect is an 
irrational or rational behavior is not relevant to explain the optimal supply of the public good of 
the jurisdiction.  
Overall then, from an optimal supply of public goods approach, the renter effect may or may not 
be relevant and when it is relevant we are not able to distinguish between the rational or irrational 
behavior of renters which is supposed to be behind their observed preferences for public goods. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we propose a theoretical framework to examine the nature and potential impacts of 
what is known as the “renter effect”. The theoretical framework takes into account cognitive 
issues and “pure” economic factors both of which may be behind the observed renters’ 
preferences on the larger size of local public provision. From a theoretical point of view we 
extend  the analysis of local public finance to shed light on the relevance of fiscal illusion for the 
size of the local public sector. In this sense our aim is to include in local public finance the 
perspective of behavioral economics and interpret some of our results as part of behavioral local 
public finance. 
The paper contributes to the existing literature in two ways. First, we introduce “cognitive 
limitation” to an issue of local public finance which has been a source of controversy for a long 
time. Second, we fill a gap in the literature about a lack of micro-foundations concerning the 
renter’s illusion hypothesis.  
Assuming that taxpayers may be affected by misperception regarding the shifting of property 
taxes we focuses on three sources of agent heterogeneity with reference of ownership status, 
preferences for public and private goods, and gross income. By taking this approach we aim to 
overcome the dichotomy between rational and irrational taxpayer's behavior to explain the renter 
effect as a function of the level of misperception.  
The theoretical model is simulated for given model parameters based on OECD economies. The 
macroeconomic” results depend on the approach taken to define optimal public good provision. 
Using a Benthamite (weighted average of agents’ utility) social welfare function, we find that 
misperception of the property tax leads to increases in local governments public expenditures. 
Thus fiscal illusion regarding property taxes can explain the empirical evidence regarding the 
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correlation between the size of public expenditures and the proportion of renters. A second 
simulation exercise is based on the median voter model and our simulation results show that the 
median voter is usually a homeowner, and that therefore in this case the rational or irrational 
renter’s vote is not relevant to explain the observed renter effect. 
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Appendix 1 
Variables Domains –Default Values for Numerical simulations 
 
Model Variables 
Domain of 
variables 
Default Values  
for Simulations 
Non rival Public Good 0g    
Elasticity of substitution 1   2   
Taxpayers Gross Income sy t  
a) 10y   
For median voter analysis: 
b) 1°scenario 32,000hy   . 
c) 2° scenario 21000renty  ; , 2 38000own owny  .  
d) 3° scenario  ,0.69 95 5.renty LogN ; 
 , 2 10.55,0.65own owny LogN  
Tax shifting  0,1I   0.5I   
Renter illusion  0,1r   0.5rev   
Tax property (per-house) 0pt   
a) 2prop Ft C N   
b) For median voter: 220propt   
Fee for public services 0st   
a) 0.1serv Vt C N   
b) For median voter: 110servt   
Illusion on expenditure  0,1e   1e   
Elasticity Private consumption  1 0,1   1 0.5   
Elasticity Public consumption 11   11 0.5   
Tax Capitalization in houses price  1,2   1   
Percentage of rent  0,1a  1 0.35a N N  ; for median voter: N=10,000 
Percentage of own  0,1b  2 0.30b N N  ; for median voter: N=10,000 
Percentage of own2  0,1c  3 0.35c N N  ; for median voter: N=10,000 
 
 
